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Abstract
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to
students, or ofﬁces to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary
compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that
agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because ten-
tative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to
take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying
population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efﬁciency. The characterized rules assign the ob-
jects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents “trade” objects from
their hierarchically speciﬁed “endowments.”
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1. Introduction
We study the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects among a group
of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are
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not possible. The classical literature on such problems is concerned with the case of initial




is the subject of recent papers by Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez (1999), Ehlers (2002), Pápai
(2000), and Svensson (1999). All these papers study the requirement that no agent can
manipulate the allocation to his advantage by lying about his preference relation. This
property, called strategy-proofness, has also been analyzed in a probabilistic setting by
Zhou (1990) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).2
In addition to efﬁciency and strategy-proofness, we study the property of population-
monotonicity (Thomson, 1983). When a change in the population is exogenous, it would
be unfair if the agents who were not responsible for this change were treated unequally.
Population-monotonicity represents this idea of solidarity, and requires that if some agents
leave, then as a result either all remaining agents (weakly) gain or they all (weakly) lose.
When the allocation rule is efﬁcient, population-monotonicity implies that if the population
expands then everyone is weakly worse off, and if the population shrinks then everyone is
weaklybetteroff.Population-monotonicityisacompellingrequirementforhouseallocation
problems, because tentative or actual assignments are made in many typical applications,
which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. For
example, if tentative preliminary dorm room assignments are revised because additional
students apply for the dorms, it would be rather unreasonable to give some students better
dormroomsthaninitiallyasaresultoftheextradormapplications.Also,imaginethatthere
is a list of term paper topics that can be assigned to students in a class, each of which is
different from the others. Suppose that the term paper topics have been assigned to students
at the beginning of the semester and it turns out that a few students dropped the course by
the 6-week mark. Would it be reasonable to assign any remaining student a harder topic, in
their opinion, than they had initially, just because some students have dropped the course?
Finally, consider the example of assigning ofﬁces to professors. Suppose that a new wing of
the building is built with new ofﬁces, and professors are offered a choice between staying
in their old ofﬁce or moving to the new wing. Some professors who signed up for an ofﬁce
in the new wing change their mind the last second (say, because of the inconvenience of
actually moving). In this case, it would clearly be quite unfair to the remaining professors
who are moving to the new wing if any one of them were assigned a worse ofﬁce than
they were assigned before. Similar examples of house allocation problems, in which the
population may change after a tentative assignment is made, abound.
Althoughpopulation-monotonicityisaratherimportantpropertyinthiscontext,itisalso
a very demanding property when coupled with efﬁciency and strategy-proofness. Our char-
acterizationresultyieldsaclassofallocationrules,calledrestrictedendowmentinheritance
1 Further papers on the housing market include Roth and Postlewaite (1977), Wako (1984), Ma (1994),
Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez (1998), and Konishi et al. (2001) (for a survey, see Moulin, 1995).
2 FurtherstudiesthatareconcernedwiththehouseallocationproblemareErgin(2000),HyllandandZeckhauser
(1979),andSvensson(1994);arelatedassignmentproblemwith“deadlines”isstudiedbyBogomolnaiaandMoulin
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rules, which are essentially hierarchical rules in the following sense. They allow “trading”
of the objects by at most two agents at a time, where these two agents share the objects
available at the given stage of the procedure as “endowments.” More precisely, such a rule
partitions the set of agents into singletons and pairs, and chooses a “priority” ordering over
these singletons and pairs. If the rule is based on a partition of all singletons, then it is a
serial dictatorship (see, for example, Ergin, 2000; Svensson, 1999), in which each agent
gets his favorite object among the objects that were not assigned to agents who precede this
agent in the priority ordering. At the other extreme of this set of allocation rules are the
onesthatarebasedonapartitionoftheagentsexclusivelyintopairs.Theserulesallowthat,
according to the priority ordering of the selected pairs, each pair “trades” objects, where
each of the remaining objects is the “endowment” of one or the other agent in the pair.
Restricted endowment inheritance rules constitute a subclass of the ﬁxed endowment hi-
erarchical exchange rules introduced by Pápai (2000).I nSection 2, we deﬁne these rules,
which we call simply endowment inheritance rules. Section 3 contains the characteriza-
tion of all rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efﬁciency.I n
Section 4, we give a short conclusion.
2. Endowment inheritance rules
2.1. The model
Let N ≡{ 1,2,...,n} denote a ﬁnite set of agents, n ≥ 2. Let K denote a set of objects
and k ≡| K|. Let 0 represent the null object.3 Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a strict
preference relation Ri over K ∪{0}. In other words, Ri is a linear order over K ∪{0}.G i v e n
x,y ∈ K ∪{ 0}, xP iy means that agent i strictly prefers x to y. Let R denote the class of
all linear orders over K ∪{ 0}, and RN the set of (preference) proﬁles R = (Ri)i∈N such
that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ R. Let R0  R denote the class of preference relations where the
null object is the worst object. That is, if Ri ∈ R0, then all the objects are “goods”: for all
x ∈ K, xPi0. Since, for the time being, the set of agents and the set of objects are ﬁxed,
RN completely describes the set of (house allocation) problems.
An allocation is a list a = (ai)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, ai ∈ K ∪{0}, and none of the
objectsinK isassignedtomorethanoneagent.Notethat0,thenullobject,canbeassigned
to any number of agents and that not all objects in K have to be assigned. An (allocation)
rule ϕ is a function choosing for every R ∈ RN an allocation, denoted by ϕ(R).G i v e n
i ∈ N, we call ϕi(R) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R).
2.2. Basic properties
The ﬁrst property requires that the rule chooses only (Pareto) efﬁcient allocations.
Efﬁciency: For all R ∈ RN, there is no allocation a such that for all i ∈ N, ai Riϕi(R)
with strict preference holding for some j ∈ N.
3 “Receiving the null object” means “not receiving any object”.332 L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339
Given R ∈ RN and M ⊆ N, let RM denote the proﬁle (Ri)i∈M. It is the restriction of R
to the set M. We also use the notations R−i = RN\{i} and R−i,j = RN\{i,j}. For example,
( ¯ Ri,R −i) denotes the proﬁle obtained from R by replacing Ri by ¯ Ri.
The second property requires that no agent ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting his pref-
erence relation.
Strategy-proofness: For all R ∈ RN, all i ∈ N, and all ¯ Ri ∈ R, ϕi(R)Riϕi( ¯ Ri,R −i).
2.3. Endowment inheritance rules
Endowment inheritance rules (Pápai, 2000) are based on Gale’s top trading cycle algo-
rithm,whichidentiﬁestheuniquecoreallocationinahousingmarket(RothandPostlewaite,
1977). We describe this algorithm ﬁrst. Given a housing market, let every agent point to
the agent who owns his ﬁrst-ranked house. This way we can identify the top trading cycles,
cycles of agents who wish to trade with each other in a feasible manner. Let every agent
in a top trading cycle receive his favorite house, and remove these agents from the mar-
ket with their allotted houses. Next, identify the top trading cycles in the reduced market,
carry out the corresponding trades, etc. Repeat this procedure until all agents are allotted a
house.
Endowment inheritance rules allot objects to agents using an iterative procedure that
is similar to the top trading cycle algorithm, except that it also speciﬁes the property
rights of the objects in an iterative hierarchical manner. Each object is the initial indi-
vidual “endowment” of an agent and we apply a round of top trading cycle exchange to
these endowments. Given that multiple endowments are allowed, after the agents in top
trading cycles are removed from the market with only their allotted objects, their unallo-
cated endowments are re-assigned as endowments to agents who are still in the market. In
other words, these objects that are left behind are “inherited” as new endowments by agents
who have not received their allotments yet. Notice that then each remaining object is the
endowment of some remaining agent and the top trading cycle algorithm is well-deﬁned at
the second stage. We determine the allotments of agents who are in top trading cycles in
this round, remove them with their allotted objects, and determine the endowments of the
remaining agents for the next stage. And so on, until for each agent we have speciﬁed an
allotment this way.
The initial endowments and the hierarchical endowments at later rounds are determined
using a so-called endowment inheritance table, which consists of a permutation of the
agents for each object, indicating the order of inheritance for the particular object. Thus,
each endowment inheritance rule is deﬁned by an endowment inheritance table. We for-
mally deﬁne the class of endowment inheritance rules and illustrate such a rule in an
example.4
Let  N denote the set of all one-to-one functions from N to N.G i v e nx ∈ K, x ∈  N,
and i,j ∈ N, x(i) < x(j) means that agent i is ranked higher than agent j with
respect to object x. The function x indicates the inheritance of object x. Furthermore,
4 We refer the reader to P´ apai (2000) for a detailed discussion of these rules.L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339 333
 ≡ (x|x ∈  N)x∈K is an endowment inheritance table that shows the inheritance of
each object.
Endowment inheritance rule ϕ: Let R ∈ RN. Then ϕ(R) is deﬁned in at most m ≡
min{n,k} stages. Given i ∈ N and R ∈ RN, we give recursive deﬁnitions of the associ-
ated hierarchical endowments Et(i,R), the top choices Tt(i,R), trading cycles St(i,R),
assigned individuals Wt(R), and assigned non-null objects Ft(R), all of which are indexed
by t ∈{ 1,...,m}, the corresponding stage. For every proﬁle R ∈ RN and stage t, let
Wt(R) ≡∪ t
z=1Wz(R) and Ft(R) ≡∪ t
z=1Fz(R). Let W0(R) ≡∅and F0(R) ≡∅ .
Staget:Ifagenti ∈ N\Wt−1(R)isrankedhighestwithrespecttoobjectx ∈ K\Ft−1(R)
among all agents in N \Wt−1(R), then x belongs to his hierarchical endowment at stage t.









Next, each agent i ∈ N \ Wt−1(R) identiﬁes his top choice in (K ∪{ 0}) \ Ft−1(R).
Top choices:
Tt(i,R) = x ⇔ x ∈ (K ∪{ 0}) \ Ft−1(R)andforally ∈ (K ∪{ 0}) \ Ft−1(R), xRiy.
A trading cycle consists of a set of agents in N \ Wt−1(R) who would like to exchange
objects from their hierarchical endowments in a “cyclical way” such that each of them




      
      
{j1,...,j g}, if {j1,...,j g}⊆N \ Wt−1(R)suchthat
|{j1,...,j g}| = g andforallv ∈{ 1,...,g},
Tt(jv,R)∈ Et(jv+1,R)wherei = j1 = jg+1,
∅, otherwise.
Agents in a trading cycle are assigned their top choices.5
Assigned individuals: Wt(R) ≡{ i ∈ N|St(i,R)  =∅ } .
Assigned non-null objects: Ft(R) ≡{ Tt(i,R) ∈ K|i ∈ Wt(R)}.
Note that for all R ∈ RN there exists a last stage t∗ ≤ m such that either Wt∗
(R) = N
or Ft∗
(R) = K and for all t<t ∗, Wt(R)  = N and Ft(R)  = K.
Given endowment inheritance table , for all R ∈ RN the allocation chosen by the






Tt(i,R), if forsomet ∈{ 1,...,m},i∈ Wt(R),
0, otherwise.
5 Note that if an agent’s top choice is the null object, he forms a trading cycle with himself, i.e. he is assigned
the null object in his own hierarchical endowment.334 L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339
Example 1. Let N ≡{ 1,2,3,4,5} and K ≡{ a,b,c,d,e,f }. Consider the endowment
inheritanceruledeﬁnedbythefollowingendowmentinheritancetable ≡ (x|x ∈  N).
Associated with each object is a permutation of the agents (given by the column corre-
spondingtotheobject).Forexample,theﬁrstcolumnshowsthatobjecta isagent2’sinitial
endowment, which is (possibly) inherited by 1, 3, 4, and 5, in this order. We illustrate the
use of this table for the preference proﬁle R ∈ RN
0 given above, which shows the rankings
of objects from the top down for each agent.
Stage 1: The initial endowments are given by the ﬁrst row of the endowment inheritance
table. The endowments are E1(1,R)={ b,d} for 1 and E1(2,R)={ a,c,e,f} for 2, and
∅ for 3, 4, and 5. Then T1(1,R) = a, T1(2,R) = b, T1(3,R) = b, T1(4,R) = d, and
T1(5,R)= a are the top choices of the agents in K ∪{0}. Hence, {1,2} is the only cycle at
Stage1underwhich1receivesa from2and2receivesb from1,i.e.S1(1,R)= S1(2,R)=
{1,2}, W1(R) ={ 1,2}, and F1(R) ={ a,b}.
Stage 2: Since agents 1 and 2 already received their allotments, objects c, d, e, and f
are left behind from 1’s and 2’s initial endowments. These objects are inherited by 3, i.e.
E2(3,R)={ c,d,e,f}andE2(4,R)= E2(5,R)=∅ .Then,3pickshistopchoice,object
e, among the remaining objects. So, S2(3,R)={ 3}, W2(R) ={ 3}, and F2(R) ={ e}.
Stage 3: Now only 4 and 5 remain in the market. Agent 4 inherits {c,f} and 5 inherits
{d}, i.e. E3(4,R)={ c,f} and E3(5,R)={ d}. Because T3(4,R)= d and T3(5,R)= f,
4 and 5form a trading cycle and receive their top choices in {c,d,f }, i.e. S3(4,R) =
S3(5,R)={ 4,5}, W3(R) ={ 4,5}, and F3(R) ={ d,f}. Then ϕ(R) = (a,b,e,d,f)are
the allotments to (1,2,3,4,5).
3. The result
We extend the model to allow population changes. Let P ≡{ 1,...,p}, p ≥ 3, be the
ﬁnitesetofpotentialagents.LetPdenotethesetofnon-emptysubsetsofP.Inthiscontext,
a rule is a function ϕ that associates with each set of agents N ∈ P and each preference
proﬁle R ∈ RN an allocation ϕ(R) = (ϕi(R))i∈N.
Population-monotonicity:6 For all N ∈ P, all R ∈ RN, and all M ⊆ N, either [for all
i ∈ M, ϕi(RM)Riϕi(R)] or [for all i ∈ M, ϕi(R)Riϕi(RM)].
6 For a survey on population-monotonicity see Thomson (1995).L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339 335
Our ﬁrst lemma states that as a result of population-monotonicity and efﬁciency, when
some agents leave the economy, none of the remaining agents loses. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying population-monotonicity and efﬁciency. If N ∈ P,
R ∈ RN, and ∅  = M ⊆ N, then for all i ∈ M, ϕi(RM)Riϕi(R).
We characterize the class of rules that are population-monotonic, strategy-proof, and
efﬁcient. It turns out that this class is a subclass of endowment inheritance rules: a rule
satisfying these properties must be a so-called restricted endowment inheritance rule.
A restricted endowment inheritance rule is an endowment inheritance rule in which at
most two agents are allowed to trade at a time, or more precisely, no more than two agents
canbeendowedwithobjectsatanystageoftheprocedure.Thisisensurediftheendowment
inheritancetablecanbe“partitioned”suchthattheelementsofthepartitionareeithersingle
rows or two adjacent rows: any single row in the partition contains one agent only and any
two adjacent rows in the partition contain two agents only. In Example 1,w eh a v er o w s1
and 2 as an element of the partition with agents 1 and 2, then row 3 with agent 3, and ﬁnally,
rows 4 and 5with agents 4 and 5. It is clear that initially agents 1 and 2 will be allotted some
objects,whetherornottheytrade,thenagent3getshisfavoriteobjectamongtheremaining
objects, and ﬁnally, agents 4 and 5 get their allotments.
Restricted endowment inheritance rules are similar to serial dictatorships, in comparison
with endowment inheritance rules that are not restricted this way. In a serial dictatorship,
there exists a hierarchy of the agents speciﬁed a priori, such that agents receive their fa-
vorite object from the set of objects that remain after we remove all the objects from the
market that are allotted to agents who are ranked higher in the hierarchy. For restricted
endowment inheritance rules, we choose one or two agents among the remaining agents
at each step of the procedure (as opposed to always choosing one agent in serial dicta-
torships), and allocate the favorite remaining object to the agent if he is chosen alone,
and to one or both agents if chosen in a pair. In the latter case, if one agent does not re-
ceive his ﬁrst-ranked object among the remaining objects (which means that it is the other
chosen agent’s favorite object as well, and it has been allocated to him), then he receives
his second-ranked object. In other words, while we have a single dictator at each stage
of the procedure for serial dictatorships, restricted endowment inheritance rules allow the
choice of “twin-dictators” as well as ordinary (single) dictators at any given stage of the
procedure.
Restricted endowment inheritance rules: Let  = (x|x ∈  P)x∈K be such that
(a) for all j ∈ P, |{−1
x (j)|x ∈ K}| ≤ 2 and
(b) for all j ∈ P,i f|{−1
x (j)|x ∈ K}| = 2, then either
{−1
x (j)|x ∈ K}={ −1
x (j − 1)|x ∈ K} or {−1
x (j)|x ∈ K}={ −1
x (j + 1)|x ∈ K}.
Let N ∈ P, |N|=n, and R ∈ RN. Deﬁne the collection of injective functions N =
(N
x : N →{ 1,...,n}|N
x ∈  N)x∈K that is induced by  as follows: let x ∈ K and
N ={ i1,...,i n} be such that x(i1)<x(i2)<··· < x(in). Then, N
x (i1) ≡ 1,
N
x (i2) ≡ 2, ..., N
x (in) ≡ n. The restricted endowment inheritance rule ϕ is deﬁned for
allN ∈ PandallR ∈ RN byϕ(R) ≡ ϕN
(R),whereϕN
(R)isdeﬁnedasinSection2.3.336 L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339
Theorem1. OnthedomainRN (RN
0 ),restrictedendowmentinheritancerulesaretheonly
rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efﬁciency.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. The following examples show logical inde-
pendence of the axioms in Theorem 1.
Population-monotonicity: An endowment inheritance rule which is not a restricted en-
dowment inheritance rule (deﬁned appropriately for variable population) satisﬁes strategy-
proofness and efﬁciency, but not population-monotonicity.
Strategy-proofness: Fix y ∈ K and an ordering σ of P, say σ = (1,2,...,p).F o r
all N ∈ P and all R ∈ RN
0 , the rule is a serial dictatorship relative to the following
ordering: ﬁrst, the rule orders according to σ the agents that rank y last, and second, the
remaining agents are ordered according to σ. This rule violates strategy-proofness because
announcing a preference relation under which y is ranked last may be proﬁtable. However,
the rule satisﬁes population-monotonicity and efﬁciency.
Efﬁciency: The rule that assigns for all proﬁles to each agent the null object satisﬁes
population-monotonicity and strategy-proofness, but not efﬁciency.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we demonstrate that guaranteeing population-monotonicity for the allo-
cation of indivisible objects comes with a serious price. Whereas without this solidarity
property agents can “trade” objects arbitrarily, once individual property rights are assigned,
the imposition of this property restricts the assignment of individual property rights and
therefore“trading”toatmosttwoagentsatatime,therebyrenderingtheselectedallocation
rules essentially hierarchical. One can intuitively see that population-monotonicity is vio-
lated if there is individual ownership: if I trade with an agent originally who then leaves the
market, then in the new setup the new owner of the object that I obtained previously may
want to trade with someone else, and I end up worse off, even though there are fewer agents
now for the same resources. Given the structure of this simple indivisible goods allocation
problem, our result suggests a general trade-off between solidarity and individual property
rights.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
By Pápai (2000), restricted endowment inheritance rules satisfy strategy-proofness
andefﬁciency.Itiseasytocheckthattheyalsosatisfypopulation-monotonicitybyconsidering
how the allotments of the agents are constructed. In proving the converse, let ϕ be a rule
satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efﬁciency. We give all proofs
for the domain R0, since the proof for the larger domain R is completely analogous.
First,forallx ∈ K,weinductivelydeﬁnex ∈  P.Second,weshowthat = (x)x∈K
satisﬁes conditions (a) and (b) in the deﬁnition of a restricted endowment inheritance rule.
Third, we prove that ϕ = ϕ.L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339 337
Step 1 (Construction of the endowment inheritance table). Given x ∈ K, let Rx ∈ RP
0 be
such that for all i ∈ P and all y ∈ K, xRiy.B yefﬁciency, for some j ∈ P, ϕj(Rx) = x.
Deﬁne x(j) ≡ 1 and −1
x (1) ≡ j.G i v e nt ∈{ 1,...,p}, let Nx
t ≡ P \{ −1
x (l)|l ∈
{1,...,t}}.B yefﬁciency, for some j ∈ Nx
t , ϕj(Rx
Nx
t ) = x. Deﬁne x(j) ≡ t + 1 and
−1
x (t + 1) ≡ j. This inductive deﬁnition yields a one-to-one function x : P → P. Note




) = x and population-monotonicity,
ϕj(Rx
N) = x. (1)
Let x ∈ K, N ∈ P, and i ∈ N. We say that ϕ respects the minimal right of agent i for
object x in N if for all R ∈ RN
0 , ϕi(R)Rix. A rule ϕ respects minimal rights for agent i in
N if there exists x ∈ K such that ϕ respects the minimal right of i for x in N.
Lemma 2. For all x ∈ K and all N ∈ P, there exists some j ∈ N such that ϕ respects the
minimal right of agentj for object x in N.
Proof. Let x ∈ K and j ∈ N be such that for all i ∈ N, x(j) ≤ x(i). We prove that ϕ
respects the minimal right of j for x in N. Let R ∈ RN
0 .
If xP jϕj(R), then by strategy-proofness, ϕj(Rx
j,R −j)  = x.B yefﬁciency, for some i ∈
N \{j}, ϕi(Rx
j,R −j) = x.B ystrategy-proofness, ϕi(Rx
j,Rx
i ,R −j,i) = x.B ypopulation-
monotonicity, ϕi(Rx
j,Rx
i ) = x. This is a contradiction to x(j) < x(i) and (1). 
Step 2 ( ≡ (x)x∈K satisﬁes (a) and (b)). Given N ∈ P and x ∈ K, let N
x : N →
{1,...,|N|} denote the one-to-one function which is induced by , i.e. for all i,j ∈ N,
N
x (i) ≤ N
x (j) ⇔ x(i) ≤ x(j).
Lemma 3. Let N ∈ P. We have (i) ϕ respects minimal rights of at most two agents in N,
i.e., |{(N
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}| ≤ 2; and (ii) if |{(N
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}| = 2, then {(N
x )−1(2)|x ∈
K}={ (N
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}.
Proof.
(i) Suppose that ϕ respects minimal rights of more than two agents in N. Hence, k ≥ 3
and |N|≥3. Without loss of generality, let 1,2,3 ∈ N and x1,x 2,x 3 ∈ K be such that
for all i ∈{ 1,2,3}, N
xi(i) = 1 (agent i has a minimal right for xi in N). Let R ∈ RN
0
be such that for all y ∈ K \{ x1,x 2,x 3},
x3 P1 x1 P1 x2 P1y,
x1 P2 x2 P2 x3 P2y,
x1 P3 x3 P3 x2 P3y.
Sinceagents1and3haveminimalrightsforx1 andx3 inN,efﬁciencyimpliesϕ1(R) =
x3 and ϕ3(R) = x1. Thus, because 2 has a minimal right for x2 in N, ϕ2(R) = x2.338 L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339
Hence, by population-monotonicity,
ϕ2(RN\{1}) = x2 andϕ3(RN\{1}) = x1. (2)
Let R  = (R 
1,R −1) ∈ RN




Since agents 1 and 2 have minimal rights for x1 and x2, efﬁciency implies ϕ1(R ) = x2
and ϕ2(R ) = x1. Thus, because 3 has a minimal right for x3 in N, ϕ3(R ) = x3.
Hence, by population-monotonicity, ϕ2(R 
N\{1}) = x1 and ϕ3(R 
N\{1}) = x3. Since
R 
N\{1} = RN\{1}, the previous fact contradicts (2).
(ii) Let {i,j}={ (N
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K} and y ∈ K. Then N
y (i) = 1o rN
y (j) = 1.
Let N
y (i) = 1 and x ∈ K be such that N
x (j) = 1. Let Rj ∈ R0 be such that
for all x  ∈ K \{ x,y}, yR jxR jx . Because ϕ respects the minimal right of i for
y in N and of j for x in N, efﬁciency implies that ϕi(Rx
i ,R j,R
y




N\{i,j}) = y. Thus, by strategy-proofness, ϕj(Rx
i ,R
y
N\{i}) = y.B y
population-monotonicity, ϕj(R
y
N\{i}) = y and 
N\{i}
y (j) = 1. Hence, N
y (j) = 2,
the desired conclusion. 
By Lemma 3, |{−1
x (1)|x ∈ K}| ≤ 2 and if |{−1
x (1)|x ∈ K}| = 2, then {−1
x (2)|x ∈
K}={ −1
x (1)|x ∈ K}. Let P1 ≡ P \{ −1
x (1)|x ∈ K} and l1 ≡| { −1
x (1)|x ∈ K}|.
By Lemma 3, |{(P1
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}| ≤ 2 and if |{(P1
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}| = 2, then
{(P1
x )−1(2)|x ∈ K}={ (P1
x )−1(1)|x ∈ K}.Thus,bydeﬁnition,|{−1
x (l1+1)|x ∈ K}| ≤
2 and if |{−1
x (l1 + 1)|x ∈ K}| = 2, then {−1
x (l1 + 2)|x ∈ K}={ −1
x (l1 + 1)|x ∈ K}.
Now, by induction, Lemma 3 implies that  satisﬁes (a) and (b).
Step 3 (ϕ = ϕ). Suppose that ϕ  = ϕ. Then there exist N ∈ P and R ∈ RN
0 such that
ϕ(R)  = ϕ(R). Hence, by efﬁciency, there exists i1 ∈ N such that ϕ
i1(R)Pi1ϕi1(R). Let
ϕ
i1(R) ≡ x1( = 0).B ystrategy-proofness, ϕi1(R
x1
i1 ,R −i1)  = x1.B yefﬁciency, for some
i2 ∈ N we have ϕi2(R
x1




i2 ,R −i1,i2) = x1.




i2 ) = x1 and by deﬁnition of , x1(i2)<
x1(i1).
By strategy-proofness and ϕ
i1(R) = x1, ϕ
i1(R
x1







i1 ,R −i1) ≡ x2( = 0)andR
x2





i2 y.Thenusingthesameargumentsasabovethereissomei3 ∈ N














i2 ,R −i1,i2) = x1.Hence,byefﬁciency,i3  = i1 (otherwise






i2 ,R −i1,i2) ≡ x3( = 0).7 So, for any l ≥ 1, we inductively obtain il,i l+1,
il  = il+1, and 0  = xl ∈ K such that xl(il+1)<xl(il) and il+1  = il−1. Because N is
ﬁnite, at some point there will be a “cycle”, i.e. there exist ik,i t ∈ N such that k<tand
xt(ik)<xt(it).Withoutlossofgenerality,leti1 = ik andconsiderthesets{i1,...,i t}⊆
N and {x1,...,x t}⊆K such that for all l ∈{ 1,...,t − 1}, xl(il+1)<xl(il) and
7 Now we would choose R
x3




i3 y.L. Ehlers et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 329–339 339
xt(i1)<xt(it). Let u ≡ x1(i1). By Step 2,  satisﬁes conditions (a) and (b). Thus, by
x1(i2) ≤ u−1 and (b), x2(i2) ≤ u. Similarly, for all l ∈{ 1,... ,t}, xl(il) ≤ u. Next, (b)
also implies xt(i1) ≥ u−1. Thus, since u ≥ xt(it)>xt(i1) ≥ u−1, xt(it) = u. This
implies that for all l ∈{ 1,...,t}, xl(il) = u. Because i1  = i3,w eh a v e|{i1,...,i t}| ≥ 3.
Now the two previous facts contradict (a).
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